
In November 2024, countries at the COP29 summit in Azerbaijan agreed on a $200bn per year increase in climate financial assistance to developing countries across the world. Western nations say a ‘massive deal was struck’ and the UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the pledges made were ‘ambitious’ from both a UK and an international perspective. Despite this, vast ideological and political division pervaded the summit. The leading Eastern developing nations such as India argued the agreement was ‘a paltry sum’ and an ‘optical illusion’ as they called for more aggressive funding to combat the climate emergency. A close examination of historical climate policies and the current geopolitical circumstances show why there is a large difference between Western and Eastern attitudes to the climate crisis.
Western and Eastern attitudes towards the climate have historically been at odds with each other. This is due to the tension created by the unequal gap in global wealth, with the rich industrialised West contrasted with the industrialising, developing nations in the East. For example, at the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio De Janeiro, Western nations posited that as Eastern developing nations produce the highest volume of fossil fuels, therefore, it is their responsibility to cut down emissions without Western assistance. On the other hand, Eastern nations argued that the West had been free to industrialise without climate agreements restraining economic progress and historically produce the most emissions. Thus, developing economies in the East argued that Western financial assistance is needed to meet radical climate agreements. Has much changed?
In 2024, the attitude of Western and Eastern nations to the climate crisis is becoming more fragmented than ever before. These divisions are due to economic disparities, political views, and cultural differences. The idea of a separate Western and Eastern hegemonic world order is outdated. In fact, the idea of East and West as binary opposites is misleading. In the Post Cold War political climate nations are not uniform in their attitudes. Instead, attitudes and policy are defined by self-interest. The political divide between developing nations and developed nations is alarmingly obvious when hearing Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman’s interpretation of COP28 agreements. Cop28 countries agreed a ‘phasing out’ of fossil fuels which bin Salman compared to an ‘A-la-carte menu’, suggesting these agreements are not commitments, rather whims of choice. Similarly, COP29 hosts Azerbaijan set out to create obstacles in negotiations. After news that local scientists defined Azerbaijan’s Absheron peninsula in the Caspian Sea “as one of the ecologically most devastated areas in the world”, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev accused “Western fake news media” of “spreading disinformation”. Both Aliyev and bin Salman’s rhetoric suggests that political national interests take priority over climate commitments.
The willingness from both developed and developing nations for climate action respectively is waning. Eastern attitudes are characterised by national economic and cultural concerns which are opposed to climate action. This can be seen through countries such as China and Russia, whose problem with climate action lies in the economic trade off in committing to radical climate agreements and cultural anti-Western sentiment aimed at the rich developed nations in the West. However, nations such as Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia consistently use theological arguments to oppose radical climate initiatives. President Aliyev described oil and gas as a “gift from God” at the COP29 conference’s opening ceremony. Not only is this extremely damaging for talks themselves, as being held in Azerbaijan, but it reinforces other nations’ ability to be defensive in negotiations.
However, amid the backdrop of President Trump’s second term in office, China shrewdly positioned itself as progressive in talks at COP29. Its former position had been to “set its own path” around fossil fuel reductions after it U-turned the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. China has been marginally more open with the UN. This can be seen through China revealing for the first time the $3.1bn of climate finance it gives to developing countries around the world even when considering that China is the largest greenhouse gas emitter on the planet. Thus, these developing nations are opposed to climate action based upon their economic, political, and cultural attitudes which present an obstacle to progress.
Furthermore, attitudes of developed nations to the climate crisis have recently become more differing than ever. Self-interest and political pragmatism are rife within developed nations’ attitudes to climate action, with there being a notable lack of leadership among these countries. For example, the leadership of the United States at COP29 has waned due to the foreboding reality of President Trump’s second term in office. This lack of international leadership from the USA at COP29 is reminiscent of the Bush administration’s U-turn on the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, which required nations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, a lack of leadership representing Western attitudes to climate action contributes to developed nations prioritising domestic self-interest. Attitudes in the East and West, between developed and developing economies, are enlarging at a time where drastic action is needed to stabilise the earth’s climate. We do not have a united international policy. Far from it. Attitudes toward climate action are likely to worsen.